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I.  INTRODUCTION
Two processes  of integration will  affect dle future of dle two economies on the Korean
peninsula:  the  integration of  each into  the  international  community  and the  economic
integration  of the  Korean  penimula itself following  the unification of two Koreas.  Only one
of these processes  is relatively far advanced: South Korea I  s participation  in regional and
global economic  systems. While  North Korea has  expressed  some willingness to explore an
at least partly open-door  policy toward the outside world and engage  in mutually beneficial
economic interaction  in the  penilN1la,  the steps it has taken so far are extremely cautious  and
tentative, and Chuche  (self-reliance) remains the official economic philosophy of the North
Korean government.
This ~r  e~  the connection of dlese two processes,  using dle program of the 18-
member economy  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as symbolic of South
Korea's ~on  aI¥l commitment to regional integrative processes.  APEC,  in its Bogor
Declaration of November 1994, called for "free trade and investment" in dle region among
the developed  countries by 2010 aOO  the developing ores by 2020.  Should APEC succeed
in this goal, it will clearly have important economic implications for South Korea.  But what
is pe~  more important  for 1Ir;  Korean penilSlla is dJat  dle success  of APEC,  which would
mean dJat  South  Korea would have fully liberalized its trade and investment, may complicate
~  ~  of ecooomic  unification on the Korean peninsula.  Upon unification  South  Korea
will  be  saddled  with  a  North  Korean  economy  that  will  require  major  structural
transformation. How this may be done at a minimum cost in an economy one half of which
is fully integrated  widi die international  community is a challenging task:. The purpose of this
paper is to proffer some ideas on how that task:  may be  handled.
Section II  discusses  the evolution of  South Korea's  regional policy,  the evolution of
APEC, aOO  implicatiom of APEC on South  Korea.  A basic point of this section is that so far
South  Korea's policy toward APEC has  ~n  formulated with scant attention to the possibility
of unification.  Section  ill  discusses  some of dle difficulties  involved  in a merger of two
disparate  ecooomies. Section  N  concl~  with a discussion  of dle policies that South  Korea
may take toward APEC.
.An earlier  version  of the  paper  was  presented  at  the  annual  American  Economic  Association  meetings,  San
Francisco,  January  5-7,1996. The authors  wish to  thank  Young  C. Kim for his useful  comments  on  the  paper.2
II.  SOUTH  KOREA AND  APEC
(1)  Soudi Korea aOO  Regional Cooperation
South Korea can claim with some legitimacy to be an originator of the APEC concept.
While  ootions of intergovernmen1al Asia-Pacific  regional  cooperation date back. in  the
academic literature  to the late l~  aIxi entered into governmen1al discussions in the late
1970s, d1e specific  proposal dJat  led  to  the creation of  APEC  came in a  January 1989
Australian-South Korean leaders  joint communique (Funabashi 1995, p.55).
~  Soudi Korean interest in being a part of broader regional arrangements  is both very
car  am has a considerable  history.  In 1967, for example, South  Korea was the principal
sponsor  of  die Asia Pacific  Council (ASP  AC)  which  was dis~  in die  early  1970s
becaW!e  Taiwan  I  s membership  as the Republic of China was no longer acceptable to most of
the  other members who  recognized die  Beijing  government following  the  Nixon  China
~ning.  This long-standing  Soudi Korean interest was less based  on the projected benefits
of ecooomic  ~ration  and nX>re  on ~  val~  k>  ~  Seoul government of its diplomatic and
political  association  with other Asia or Asia-Pacific governments.
Some of these benefits are as follows:
(a)  By associating  SoudI  Korea widI o~r  regional states, it conferred legitimacy on dte
SoudI  Korean  stlte.  This was regarded as very important to Seoul, which for many
years saw  i~ foreign  policy primarily in terms of a struggle with Pyongyang.  During
much of this period Soudt Korea was a kind of Asian orphan, geographically oot
eligible for subregional  association  in Southeast  Asia, uncomfortable with Japan, am
unrecognized by the People's Republic of China am  the Soviet Union.
(b)  There was  a potential  in regional cooperation for developing associations  widt Asian
govermnen~  widI which South  Korea did oot yet have diplomatic relations.  In fact,
SoudI  Korea took  the lead in oogotiating China's entry into APEC (along widt that
of Taiwan and Hong Kong) prior  to the second  APEC ministerial in Seoul in 1991
aIxi in ~  pr~  a~nted  i~ contacts  and relations with the mainland government
(Funabashi 1995, pp.73-76).
(c)  The  association with Asia-Pacific countries represented  a diversification  of South
Korea's foreign  policy which has  been  cJ1aracterized  by an asymmetrical relationship
widI ~  United  States. This diversification oot only made sense  in terms of foreign
policy  but also in terms of domestic policy,  where Korean nationalism favored an
apparent reduction of tensions  widt the United States.  At the same time, as South
Korea became less aI¥:lless certain about U.S.  commitments in dIe region,  Asia-
Pacific  cooperation was seen as a  way  of  adding to dIe U.S.-Asia  links  and
maintaining dte U. S. interest  am  presence  in the region.
(d)  South Korea could gain bargaining leverage vis-a-vis  larger ooighbors or trading
partners  through association with  odler  medium-sized or  smaller countries with
similar interests.3
For South  Korea, APEC is thus a vehicle for association  with other Asia-Pacific  nations,
an opportunity for  maintaining but diversifying  its relatio~  with  the United States, and a
venue for maximizing its influence and bargaining leverage.  In terms of domestic politics,
APEC  clearly seemed to have positive be~fits  for  South Korea and few  or  no political
regatives.  However, the evolution  of APEC from a"tIJk shop" in its earlier stage (1989-95)
toward a vehicle  for the implementation  of trade aM  investment liberalization  and facilitation
(from  1995 onward) makes  APEC potentially more controversial.
(2) APEC's Evolution  am die Vision  of Free  Trade  and  Investment
APEC's evolution  over k  ~  of the past six years suggests  dtat (a) the time was ripe
for  an Asia-Pacific  wide  cooperative organization aId  (b)  enough of  the core member-
economies in APEC  had experience widI  multilateral  institutions so dtat they relatively
quickly  developed a modus operandi dtat facilitated the development of die organization.
During  these early years, APEC can be said to be a talk shop, that is, a series of meetings
that  issued  declarations  aOO  communiques  but little substantive  results.  AldIough 10 working
gr~  were set  up relatively early,  these  too appear to have been discussion  fora,  often for
relatively technical issues.
100 ASEAN countries in particular were reluctant to see  APEC  development into a real
institution.  This reluctance is reflected in  the name obviously lacking a noun that gives a
sense  of an organization.  A secretariat was created only in 1993, aOO  then only the most
minimal structure possible to provide a center for coordination of dIe plethora of meetings
taking  place under APEC auspices. Only a modest  augmentation  was agreed to at the 1995
Osaka Ministerial  Meeting.
Two clJanges  came togekr  in 1.w3  d1at  began  APEC's transfomJation  into something that
may be mJre than  a talk shop-~  establisblrent  of an Emire~t Persons Group (EPG) and the
first infomJal Ecooomic LeaOOrs  Conference.  The 1993-95  Ernioont Persons Group, led by
C.  Fred  Bergsten,  was dominated by econornis~ who  largely  saw APEC  in  terms  of
ecooornic  liberalization.  The group had a powerful effect on the APEC institution,  guiding
k  ecooomic  leaders  toward a vision of free ~  aM invesunent  in the region by 2020 (2010
for the advanced  economies).
This would not have occurred, however, had oot APEC' s highest decision-making body
been transformed, albeit informally.  from die ministerial to the head-of-government level.
The Leaders  Conference  came at the initiative of President  Bill  Clinton during the American
year  for  chairing APEC  (1993).  It was unprecedented  in dIe sense  that there had never
before in history been a joint meeting of the leaders of the three great powers of the Asia-
Pacific region-China, Japan,  aixl k  United States-much less with an array of leaders from
rearly all k  other  nations.  By 1994, the Leaders  Conference appeared to be an established
annual affair  that would be difficult  for any leaders  to miss (although, of course, some will
from time-~  aM in fact ~  Clinton reluctantly did in 1995).  It was the Leaders,
and particularly  President Suharto in  1994, that embraced the EPG vision of free trade,4
setting APEC dle task of coming up with an action agenda  aM requiring  "down payments"
by the time of dle 1995  Osaka  summit.
The  principal  discordant oote in these  fonnative  years came from Malaysia.  Prime
Minister Mahatbir bad urged  ~  establishment  of an East Asia Ecooomic Caucus (EAEC)  in
1~,  aM  this  proposal was strongly opposed  by U.S.  Secretary  of  State  James Baker, who
lobbied particularly hard against  it at dle time of the 1991 Seoul  APEC ministerial meeting.
lrere  were several stated  aM implied American reservations: dlat EAEC  might detract
attention from APEC aM would,  in any event, add oodling to APEC;  dlat EAEC  might be
a focal  point for  Congressional protectionism targeted against Asian countries (which the
Administration  was combatting); aM  dlat by omitting the United States, the EAEC  might
easily  become Japanese  dominated, with possible economic implications for the U.S.-Japan
relationship.
Although ~  EAEC evoked  ~diy  in pan-Asianist  elements  in Japan  aM  South  Korea,
the two  governments were more strongly influenced by die regative  sentiments from the
United States.  A perception  of a relatively lukewarm e~n¥:nt  of the concept by ASEAN
aL'iO  helped  ~  foreign ministries  resist  ~  EAEC pressure. Of dle Northeast Asian countries
only China outright endorsed the EAEC concept.
Mahathir  petulantly igoorred  the  first  APEC  leaders meeting, but  he attended the
following two, aId Malaysia  offered to host APEC in 1998.  The Malaysian government has
continued to express its opposition to over-institutionalizing aM insisted that the 2010/2020
dates  are indicative rather than  binding.
(3)  Negotiating Free Trade and Investment
By all  appearances,  dJe Bogor Declaration was adopted widlout much attention to the
ootaib.  Malaysia expressed  reservations  at dJe  time, aOO  Thailam did a little  later.  But for
the most part dJe strategy seemed  to be dJe  ore also adopted  by ASEAN  in establishing its
own  free  trade area-gereral  statements first  aOO  regotiated details later.  This  raised
numerous questions, however.  The most basic was how dJe vision  of  free  trade and
investment is to be achieved, particularly since APEC itself was oot formally  a negotiating
body.  Nor was the Declaration biOOing. As ooted by an Indoresian representative at the
first  Senior Officials  Meeting  following  Bogor,  it  entailed a  political  but  not a  legal
commitment.
As a political  commitment, d1e  APEC member-ecooomies  wrestled with the question of
how  to proceed toward  achieving dJeir goal  for  the  November 1995 Osaka meeting-a
blueprint of how to proceed (or "action plan") aOO  "downpayments--that is, concrete steps
UJ  be taken. 1re  principal mechanism, called "concerted uni1ateralism" for a time,  seeks  to
move forward  on the basis of coordinated, voluntary liberalization and deregulation.  This
concept,  building  upon  the  recognized past steps being  taken  in  the  region  toward
liberalization  and deregulation, hopes to hasten  aOO  organize d1e  process.  Each member,
referring  to commitments  made by the others, could gain political  backing for  going ahead5
at an even fuster  pace widiliber.ilization  steps that were in its own self-interest to carry forth
anyway aOO  were consistent  with uIxlerlying directions in the regional economy.
It  raised,  however,  several questions that were basically papered over  in die  Osaka
summit.  These  include:
(a)  Comprehensiveness. Should free trade and investment cover all goods, or could
there  be exclusions.  No ore had said anything in Bogor about exclusions, but dIe
strong  rice lobbies  in N~  Asia were opposed  to any liberalization beyond dIose
agreed to in dIe Uruguay RooM  regotiations.  On this commodity Japan, SoudI
Korea,  Taiwan, and China were arrayed formally  asking for a waiver,  while dIe
other  14 member-economies insisted on comprehensiveness.  In  dIe  end,  the
Northeast Asia  group agreed to dIe principle  of  comprehensiveness  so long as
"flexibility"  is to be applied.
(b)  Comparability.  The United States insisted mat dIe measures taken unilaterally
~  to have roughly comparable economic benefit for odIer member-economies.
This  notion,  however, suggests  a level of regotiation and formalization  mat many
members  were not  willing  to undertake.  How it is applied in practice remains to be
seen.
(c)  The 2010-2020  DiviOO. Which countries  should be required to meet dIe earlier dates
and which dIe second?  The biggest question  here is China, which regards itself as
a developing country reeding the extra ten years.
(d)  Most-favored  Nation  Treatment.  APEC  is  designed as  a  form  of  "open
regionalism"  and this means, in the view of some countries, mat trade concessions
made within d1e  APEC si¥>uld  be liberalized  toward dIe world as a whole.  But in dIe
view of odIer  countries,  especially  dIe United States, this posture is not politically  or
economically  sound  because  it allows countries outside the region to free ride on
trade concessions  among regional countries without giving anything in return.1
In addition to  concerted  lireralizatoin,  die APEC memrers will  take collective action and
seek trade liberalization dlrOUgh  influencing  die WTO  process.2  At  this point,  it is  still
unclear  how APEC  will  proceed as a trade liberalization device,  but it does appear dlat
despite  other areas  of cooperation  (including a 1xoad  category  of "development cooperation"),
trade and investment liberalization will  be die main dln1St  of APEC.  It is quite unclear,
lThe United States  has  a specifiC  feaelVation  regarding  the  People's  Republic  of China which comes
under the "Jackson-Vanik"  provisions  of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974,  originally intended  to encourage
Jewish  emigration  and other human  rights from the  Soviet  Union.  Under Jackson-Vanik,  the President
must annually ask that most-favored  nation  treatment  be extended  to China as  a communist  country, and
any broader guarantee  of most-favored-nation  would be inconsistent  with this law.
2Next  year's November  1996  APEC meeting  precedes  the December  1996  wro  ministerial in
Singapore. The APEC leaders  agreed  to "expore  joint initiatives' in the wro.6
however, what political will e~  in any  of k  APEC member-econo1mies  (apart from small
traditionally free trade oriented  ecooomies  like Hong Kong aOO  Singapore) for true free trade.
In  the United States, for example, k  Congress has not reinstated so-called  "Fast Track
Audtority"  under which the Administration undertakes  trade negotiations, even to negotiate
the accession to NAFfA  of Chile.  There is particular opposition to free trade widt Asian
countries because  of the perception dlat dtese  have alien business  cultures widt  established
informal  barriers  to U.S.  exports beyooo ~  reach of  trade negotiators and d1at  some
countries'  very  low wages combined widt  an relatively efficient work force  will  present a
competitive  threat to higher wage U.S. iOOustries  d1at  die United States  cannot cope  widI.
In die case  of China, diere  also seems  to be  considerable  opposition  to substantial  trade
liberalization, resulting  in a stand-off  between  dle major developed  countries  (the Quad
group-U.S.,  Japan,  European  Community,  and Canada)  and.China  over its World Trade
Organization  membership.  China  used  ~  Osaka  APEC meetings  to anoounce  tariff cuts  on
4000 items (yet to be determiood)  and odler liberalization  measures,  and this has been
welcomed  as a step  forward even  though  it canoot  yet be fully evaluated. As pointed  out
above, Japan  and South  Korea have special problems  over rice, but even aside from
agriculture,  neither country is noted for  its aggressive  stance  on trade liberalization.
Therefore, while die 2010/2020  targets  may seem  far off today, they also appear  quite
unrealistic.
(4) Soudt  Korea  aM APEC Free  Trade  aM Investment
Uke ~  o~r  leaders,  Soudi Korean President Kim Young Sam has endorsed die APEC
vision  as a political  if  oot a legal obligation.  Soudt Korea is gradually  liberalizing  aoo
deregulating  its ecooomy,  so dJat it  is  moving  in  the direction established by APEC.
Moreover,  APEC would seem to provide Soudt Korea widt some guarantee  of being in die
same  ecooomic  grouping as ~  Uni~  Staa,  im single  ~  important market.  Soudi Korea
had  been concerred  about the direction  of  U.S.  trade policy  iOOicated by  NAFrA,  a
preferential arrangement  in whicll Soudt  Korea was left out.  The APEC  arrangement would
reduce the discriminatory  margin over time of the NAFr A.
The free trade aOO  inv~nt  screma ~nt,  oowever, a number of challenges for Soudi
Korea.  These  include:
(a)  Soudi Korea is already ~r  extemive unilateral pressure from die United States  on
a numOOr  of trade  fron~.  Soudi Korea presumably has been looking at APEC more
as  a vehicle to cantlin such  unilateral  pressures  in concert with other Asian countries
than as a vehicle for adding to such  pressures.7
(b)  Soudt  Korea has a special sensitivity with respect to trade liberalization widt Japan,
00d1  for current ecooomic  ~ns  as well as for historical reasons.  Thus Korea has
sought to discriminate in favor of imports from the United States  and against  dIose
from Japan.  Such discrimination could become increasingly difficult.
(c)  As noted  above, agriculture is particularly  difficult  sector for South  Korea and other
Northeast Asian countries in which to envision free trade.  South Korea does not
want to  go beyond the very politically  difficult  commitments it has already made in
the Uruguay Round.
(d)  South Korean industrial  sectors will  have increasing concerns about lower wage
manufacwred imports from China and developing Southeast  Asian countries.
(e)  South Korea has a reputation for a particularly restrictive investment climate with
quite  ~  foreign investment relative to overall investment in the economy.  Thus
any significant degree of investment liberalization beyond equal nation treatment  is
likely to be resisted by economic and bureaucratic interests.
Therefore, while we have not attempted  to model  the implications  for South  Korea  of
APEC  trade  liberalization,  there is reason  to believe  that  South  Korea will approach  APEC
trade and investment  liberalization  cautiously,  just as in the case  of most other APEC
ecooomies.
m.  APEC  AND THE UNIFICATION  OF  TWO KOREAS
As k  discussion  in k  preceding  ~on  imicates,  South  Korea I  s policy toward regional
cooperation and APEC  seems  to be premised on there oot being a merger of two disparate
eoooomies.on  k  ~ninsula.  Given, oowever, that there is a possibility of such  a merger, we
~  k>  examire what implicatiom it might have for South  Korea I  s policy toward APEC.  If,
oowever, North Korea maintains its own political regime, its policies with respect to APEC
will  also proceed entirely independently.
If  unification takes  place before die North Korean ecooomy has reached the same level
of  development  as the southern counterpart aOO  before its external and internal economic
policies  has become congruent with  those of  South Korea,  there will  be two  disparate
economies but under one policy  regime on the Korean peninsula.  One will  almost have
~  ~  status  of a fully developed  ecooomy with its markets well integrated with die rest
of  the world  whereas the other will  be still developing, if  not isolated from die rest of die
~ld  aid  following socialist  principles of ecooomic management. It seems  likely,  however,
that in any scenarios involving political  integration the more disadvantaged  economy would
~k  full integration,  as indeed  was the case  in Germany.  Given the possibility of unification
and a merger of such disparate  economies, we need to evaluate whether the current SoudI
Korean policy stance  toward APEC is appropriate aOO,  if rot,  how it should be changed.
The  unification experience of Germany has clearly demonstrated  that the merger of a
former  centrally planned socialist ecooomy with a capitalistic open-market economy is a
costly  process involving  both  structural transformation aoo ecooomic integration.  Any8
structural  change  of the magnitude that East Germany has gone through is costly in terms of
output and employment, whether such  a change involved the transformation of a centrally
p1anrk".d  to market  economy or even  a significant change within a market economy.  In fact,
~  post-World War II conversion  of a war-rlJre k>  a ~ce-time  economy in the United States
brought about  a contraction in output aM  employment no less severe in magnitude than that
suffered  by East Germany (Schatz  aM  Schmidt 1992).  In the case of East Germany die
problem  was  compounded by  the  fact  that  its  economy,  while  undergoing  strutural
transformation, was at ~  ~  ~  being inkgrated with die rest of d1e  world  (Schmidt and
Sander 1993, Siebert 1993).
A  merger  of a former  socialist economy with a capitalist open economy involves, as
demonstrated in the case  of Germany, both structural transformation aM  integration.  The
first  requires  privatizing  state-owned enterprises,  dismantling  collective  farms,  and
establishing  markets  and the institutions of economic policy such  as the legal framework for
economic  activity,  government administration,  the central  bank,  the  banking  system,
companies  as well as employer and labor associations. The secooo  entails die liberalization
of trade as well as the migration of people aM  the flow of capital aM  thus integrating the
North Korean economy with the South  Korean ecooomy aM  those in the rest of the world.
Transforming a socialist economy into a capitalistic market economy has been shown to
be a costly aOO  time-consuming  process. There is no reason to expect odterwise in the case
of North Korea even though markets aM  market-supporting institutions will  be transferred
from Soudi Korea in a relatively  short  ~ri<xi  of tiIre.  The process of privatizing  state-owned
enterprises  can be,  however,  a  lengthy pr~  aM  it  is  important  to  carry  it  out as
expeditiously  as  ~ble  (Lee aOO  Reisen 1994).  Unlike China, the North Korean economy
in the context of unification would oot have sufficient autonomy to delay this process.  The
German experience strongly reco~~  a shock-like transformation of  North Korea to a
market-based  system.  That  is,  d1e introduction  of  markets,  privatization,  and  die
establislunent  of market-supporting  institutions should be carried out oot in a gradual manner
but all together in as short a ~ri<xi  of time as possible (DIW  1995).
One  of  the  most critical  issues in transformation  is the privatization  of  d1e  economy
through  the  privatization  of  state-owned enterprises aM  die  creation  of  new  private
enterprises-die  so-called bottom-up privatization.  The privatization of most, if  not all, of
state-owred  enterprises  in North Korea will have k>  be carried out as quickly as possible upon
unification.  Privatization ex~riences  in East Germany aM  PolaOO  point out that although
privatizing small-scale  enterp~,  ~ially  in the service sector, is relatively easy there are
several obstacles to privatizing large state-owned  industrial enterprises.3
Experiences in other fomler  socialist countries demonstrate that many of  state-owned
enterprises  are overstaffed,  inefficient, aM  lack com~titive  quality standards. Furthermore,
3Privatization  of small commercial  and industrial finna wu  rapidly carried out in Poland. Financing
them  seem. to be a major problem  u  banking sy.tern wouMi  have difficultyin appraising  small fum.
headed  by new  entrepreneuR  (Fisher  1992». Thia is another  reason  for establishing  special  development
banks in North Kola.9
the claims of dispossessed  previous owrers and the lack of capital market institutions have
hindered rapid privatization (Schmieding 1992).
Uncertainty  regarding  pr~rty  rights (owrership) has been  identified as a main cause  for
lack of investment  and, worse, for depletion of the existing assets  in eastern Germany (Sinn
1992).'  The establishment  of a clear owrership tide can be, however,  a highly  politically
sensitive and time-conswning process.  Some of the reasons for  that are the difficulty  in
distinguishing between the owrership of a fim1 and the owrership  of land, incomplete and
~glected  records, administrative bottlerecks in processing claims applications (1.2 million
applications  in ~  case of Germany), and multiple owrership  claims when a firm  has  added
pieces of land and buildings over time (Siebert 1991).
In Germany, until March 1991 any attempts  at privatization by the Treuhandanstalt  was
frozen wherever claims by previous owrers were announced.4 A decision on 23 April  1991
by ~  German  Constitution Court has  reduced, but not eliminated, the role of restitution by
ruling that restitution does not have to be the only solution for expropriation that took place
after  1949.  The  decision has thus  separated in  principle  the issue of  the  claims of
dispossessed  previous owrers from the issue of compensation.
In  North Korea, disputes over owrership may be less a serious obstacle as most of the
private enterprises that were socialized in 1946 had belonged to the Japanese  and would not
claimed by their former owrers.  Many of die enterprises that were established after 1946
were created  by die state  or local authorities, and there would be no claims for  restitution or
compensation  against them.  But even in these  cases  potential disputes could arise over the
ownership of the land on which state-owred  enterprises  were established. To prevent such
disputes from  stalling  the privatization process, unified  Korea  should establish from  the
beginning  that compensation, oot restitution, is the gereral  remedy in settling ownership
disputes.  Then, enterprises can be rapidly privatized with die compensation  being made at
a later date by the state  wherever owrership disputes  are settled.
Bottom-up  privatization  is a key  to privatizing  the ecooomy, but in the case of East
Germany it has  oot been  very successful  as its ecooomic integration with West Germany had
~  effect of diverting demand from East German firms to imports from West Germany and
the rest of die world.  lacking  experieoce  widt am knowhow about a market economy, many
East German firms were unable to compete  with imports from  West Germany and the rest
of the world.  If East Germany  had  maintli~  its own currency system it could have selected
an appropriate exchange rate to compensate  for their lack of international competitiveness.
Clearly, integration  of the East German ecooomy with that in West Germany under a single
currency  system has made more it difficult  for East German finns  to be competitive with
imports.
~e  Treaty on German  Economic,  Monetary  and Social  Union of July 1, 1990, which fomlalized  the
~nomic  union of the Federal  Republic  of Gennany  and the Gennan  Democratic Republic,  established
the Treuhandanstat  ("trust  fund") to help privatize  the state--oWned  enterprises while  restructuring  the
supporting  them  temporarily.10
The  same is likely  to happen in North Korea  if  integration takes place with the South
Korean ecooomy  w:xIer  a single currency system aOO  with South  Korea following  the APEC
schedule on trade and investment liberalization.
1re  German unification experience suggests  that the integration of North Korea into the
world  market should happen more  gradually step by step to allow  firms  to adjust to the
fuIWmentilly  changed  enviromrent  h  pointed out in the DIW report,  North  Korean firms
should be given "handicaps" while integrating into the world  market by observing the rules
of  international competition among market ecooomies and refoml  its laws aoo institutions
accordingly.  As  a  way of  providing  North  Korea  with  a  handicap the  DIW  report
recommends a separate  curre~  system for North  Korea with either a freely  floating or
officially  fixed variable  exchange  rate.  This is certainly a possibility if  what is to take place
on the Korean Peninsula is just a commonwealth of two Koreas.  If,  however,  there is a
&Jdden  merger as in the case of Germany, it is very unlikely mat there will  be two separate
currency areas on the peninsula.  The timetable for trade and investment liberalization  for
unified Korea will then  beco~  1hat  for Soudi  Korea, aIKl  oow die oorthern part of the unified
Korea can be provided with a handicap becomes  a matter of serious concern.
Safeguards will  be available for APEC  members to temporarily halt,  or even reverse,
liberalization  mat they have already anoounced, as a  result of  import  surges or  other
~xpected  effects on their ecooomies.  South  Korea may opt to follow die current timetable
for trade  and investment  liberalization but use die safeguards  when unification  actually takes
place.  It  must be recognized, however,  that since safeguards  are industry-  or product-
specific,  they may not be an effective tool in helping ecooomy-wide structural adjustment.
The matter will  be further complicated since it will  be difficult  to apply safeguards only on
~  produced  by Nordl Korean enterprises.  It is oovertheless  important that safeguards be
made  available to South  Korea if aOO  when unification takes  place on die Korean peninsula.
Given that a unified Korea widI a common currency will have to maintain one common
timetable and given that safeguards  may oot be an adequate  handicap for  the North Korean
economy,  subsidies may have to be given for  both investment and employment  in North
Korea.  Subsidies on investment will encourage die inflow  of capital to North Korea while
subsidies  on employInent  will discourage  the move~nt  of labor from North  to South Korea.
Given  the likelihood  that such subsidies will  be large and given  mat a severe economic
hardship in unified  Korea  may have a significant  regional spillover effect,  Sough Korea
should  request  APEC to help create  a regional fuOO  for unification on the Korean peninsula.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Our review  of APEC  aIxl  ~  relating  to unification  suggests  several  conclusions.  First,
to  a remarkable degree  in both  analytical  aIxl policy ~~  Soudt  Korea seems to have isolated
its APEC (and WTO) policies toward die region aOO  globe from issues  of Korean unification
aIxl its economic consequences. This disjunction probably represents  at least three factors:11
(1)  APEC is an ongoing process to which the South  Korean government needs  to relate
here aM  now, while  North-South unification remaim highly speculative.
(2)  Recognizing  the ecooomic dislocatiom that would occur to its own society from any
German-style  unification,  the South Korean  government basically  hopes for  a
controlled process of peaceful integration.  South  Korea's unwillingness to grapple
seriously  with  the implicatiom  of other scenarios may reflect  the power  of this
wishful but quite possibly unrealistic thinking.  .
(3)  Finally,  bureaucratically,  APEC and Korean unification are dealt with in different
South Korean ministries.
It is our relief  that Soudi Korea should give more careful attention to the implications of
APEC for Korean unification arKl  vice versa.  Clearly,  South  Korea's preoccupation in this
free  trade  arKl investment scheme hastens its  integration  into  the  regional  and  global
economies  aM will add to ~  gap retween the two Korean economies, complicating the later
convergence  process. Soudi Korea mild  rot ~crifice  ~  renefits it can gain through APEC
liberalization  on account of some  hypothetical process of future unification.  And whatever
time unification occurs, the managing of the ecooomic adjustment  processes in the Korean
peninsula  will  re  SoudI Korea's  highest  priority.  This may require some derogation from
APEC obligatioM.  The question is oot really ore of trade-offs retween APEC  membership
arKl unification,  but how to manage  bodi in the best  possible manner.
Second, as part of its efforts  to assist  North Korea in developing a more  open posture
toward  die  rest of  the world,  Soudi Korea should offer  to keep the North  continuously
infom1ed  about  APEC activities arKl SoudI  Korea's policies toward diose activities.  Despite
APEC's pro~ty  so fur to ~n  ra~  1ban  deepen, it is unrealistic to expect North Korea
10  re  accepted  by dle odler memrers for ~mbership  at any time soon.  However,  APEC has
decided  to  establish a  procedure  by  which oon-memrers  may,  on a  consensus basis,
participate  in APEC  working  group activities.  SoudI Korea could encourage the North to
become involved in these  oon-political working groups.
It is likely dJat  Nord! Korea will regard  as patronizing Soudi Korean efforts to brief about
or consult widI  Pyongyang on APEC activities or encourage North Korean participation in
APEC  working groups.  For this reason, SoudI Korea should make its steps toward Nord!
Korea on dIese matters in a low-key,  patient  manner.
Finally,  it  should  re  rememrered  that  APEC  involves  "econoInic  and  technical
cooperation"  in 13 specific areas  as well as  ~  aM investment  lireralization  and facilitation.
Many of these  areas  -human  resource  ~velop~nt,  iOOustrial  science  and technology, small
aM  mediwn enterprise  ~Ve1oplrent, erergy, telecommunications,  trade promotion,  fisheries
aM  agricultural techoology, for example -may  re  quite relevant to Korean unification.
Certainly  if dIere is a sudden  reunification, dJe  ecoooInic costs to SoudI Korea will re
much higher in proportion to ~  size  of its own ecooomy than was the German reunification.
Since  unification, however, will contribu~ to  ~  peace arKllong-term prosperity of die entire
Asia-Pacific regime, Korea's APEC ~rs  have  an incentive to assist  SoudI Korea with the
unification effort.  Ore could imagire that  APEC might  have  a special supportive role to play12
in this pr~.  To eoo on the theme at the beginning our conclusions, however, APEC  will
be prepared  to play such  a role only if ~re  has been  some preparatory thinking and planning
about what such  a role might entail, at least in the South  Korean government and one or two
of d1e  od1er  major APEC governments.  However, APEC and reunification should not be in
tension, but should be mutually supportive.13
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